“The failure of the U.S. to uphold its commitments under the Bretton Woods Agreement to redeem the dollar for gold at $35 per ounce was the primary cause of the great inflation in all the world’s currencies. Just to recap events: In 1944 the allied powers agreed that the dollar would serve the same role as gold for the purposes of international currency settlements after World War II. At that time the U.S. owned (or safe kept for allied governments who were at war and whose territories were threatened by invasion) most of the gold reserves of the allied central banks. As long as the U.S. would keep its dollar to gold ratio at the agreed-upon $35 per ounce ratio, central banks around the world could settle their trading accounts in dollars. These central banks would maintain an agreed-upon ratio of dollars to their local currencies just for this purpose. The world would be on a ‘gold exchange standard’. If one country inflated its currency, its trading partners would demand dollars in exchange far in excess of the profligate country’s ability to pay. It would be forced to deflate. Just as the case under a true international gold standard, that country’s prices would fall, its exports would increase, thus generating dollar reserves and all would be back to equilibrium. The key to this whole program was the promise of the United States itself not to inflate. But, of course, this is exactly what it did.
Theoretically, the U.S. should have been placed in the same position as any other country that inflated its currency–instead of running out of dollars, the U.S. would run out of gold. Its gold reserves did dwindle, which should have set off alarms at the International Monetary Fund, which was charged with the job of auditing the gold supplies of the U.S. and ensuring that it honored its obligations. But the IMF did not do its job. Why? This enters the arena of psychology, but I imagine that the Cold War had something to do with it. The U.S. alone was capable of protecting the Allies from the growing Soviet threat. Perhaps the Allies and the IMF felt an obligation not to criticize their protector. Who knows? But once France got the atomic bomb and a president—Charles de Gaulle—who felt comfortable acting as an equal on the international stage, it no longer felt that it needed to cow tow to the U.S. So in 1963 France demanded to be repaid in gold for its ever-increasing stockpile of dollars. This should have instilled much needed fiscal and monetary discipline in the U.S., but it did no such thing. President Johnson committed the U.S. to fighting a foreign war AND instituting new welfare entitlements—his ‘guns and butter’ policy. In 1969 President Nixon could have reversed this policy, but he feared that the inevitable recession would mean the loss of a second term, so he simply reneged on Bretton Woods and ‘closed the gold window’ in 1971. So much for U.S. honor and prestige!” (Read more from patrickbarron.blogspot.com)