he Russian military anticipates that an attack will occur on Iran by the summer and has developed an action plan to move Russian troops through neighboring Georgia to stage in Armenia, which borders on the Islamic republic, according to informed Russian sources.
Russian Security Council head Viktor Ozerov said that Russian General Military Headquarters has prepared an action plan in the event of an attack on Iran.
Dmitry Rogozin, who recently was the Russian ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, warned against an attack on Iran.
“Iran is our neighbor,” Rogozin said. “If Iran is involved in any military action, it’s a direct threat to our security.” Rogozin now is the deputy Russian prime minister and is regarded as anti-Western. He oversees Russia’s defense sector.
Read more: http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-04-09/news/31311454_1_russian-defense-ministry-military-action-dmitry-rogozin#ixzz1suALPT7B
(Read more)
An important question to be evaluated here is if nuclear weapons were used or if there was nuclear explosions or leaks, what would fall out effects be? Where would fall out travel?
What are potential wind patterns?
Ed K
Another question to be asked “Is Putin a reincarnation of Stalin?”
With his buildup of military along Iranian border, read
the following article. It is time to evaluate:
Russia: Scholars Shed New Light on Cold War Kremlin
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65284http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65284
“For a few dedicated academics, the Cold War
isn’t dead. While recent archival research tends
to uphold existing interpretations of the superpower
confrontation, scholars have made a few exciting
finds.
Mark Kramer, director of the Cold War Studies
Program and senior fellow at the Davis Center
for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard
University, discussed some recent discoveries
during an early April seminar at George
Washington University.
In work that has relevance to the present day,
Kramer said that documents recently reviewed
in Soviet archives shed light on the Kremlin’s
decade-long war effort in Afghanistan. The
archives make clear that most Soviet military
commanders “were opposed to getting involved”
in Afghanistan since they wanted to fight wars in
Europe, or against China and “not get bogged
down in peripheral areas.” But the KGB and other
power ministries eventually forced a reluctant
Politburo to act in late 1979. The Red Army
remained in Afghanistan until 1989.
The archives also showed “how the Soviet Union
managed to get out of a conflict that it probably
should not have gotten involved in.” Kramer says
it would be a mistake to consider the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan a total failure—the
military made some “costly early mistakes,” but
then turned things around and waged a reasonably
effective counter-insurgency campaign.
An overlooked aspect of the Soviet occupation is
the skill with which the Red Army’s withdrawal
was executed. In addition, the Afghan government
under Najibullah that Moscow left behind managed
to survive for three years on its own, and fell only
after the Soviet Union itself disintegrated. Kramer
remarked that current Afghan President Hamid
Karzai would be lucky to survive so long without
NATO combat forces in the country propping up his
administration. Still, “if the Soviet leaders had heeded
their original instincts they probably would have
been better off,” Kramer said.
Kramer went on to highlight the work of a
colleague, Jamil Hasanli, whose research focuses
on Stalin’s efforts to seize Iranian Azerbaijan
immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany.
Hasanli’s recently published book, At the Dawn
of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over
Iranian Azerbaijan, draws on formerly top-secret
materials in the Soviet and Azerbaijani archives,
as well as documents from American, British, and
Iranian sources. It focuses on the rise and collapse
of the national government of the autonomous
republic of Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945–46.
Hasanli’s study also examines triangular relationships
involving politicians in Baku, Tabriz, and Moscow,
illustrating the influence of local actors and
personalities on great power politics. The lessons
of that post-World War II episode remain pertinent
today. “It still would be politically a very questionable
proposition to somehow try to unify [those] regions,
or encourage insurgencies,” Kramer said.
Among the other interesting tidbits of Kramer’s
April 4 presentation, Stalin’s death in 1953 may
have averted a US-Soviet conflict. “In the final two
years of Stalin’s life (1951-53),” Kramer noted,
“preparations for war on the part of the Soviet
Union were far more extensive than previously
realized” by either scholars or US policy makers.
Conventional wisdom in the United States had long
held that the vigorous American response to the
North Korean invasion of the South had “dissuaded”
further Soviet aggression. But documentation in
East European archives show that the Soviet bloc
experienced a “war scare” in January 1951, when
Stalin ordered a crash military buildup. According
to Kramer, the Soviet armed forces doubled in size
over the next two years.
Stalin’s mood appears to have taken “a much more
pessimistic turn at the end of his life,” Kramer said.
Immediately after Stalin’s death, the war scare
ended and Soviet bloc governments halted their
expensive buildup.”