Russia Is Massing Troops On Iran’s Northern Border And Waiting For A Western Attack

open quotehe Russian military anticipates that an attack will occur on Iran by the summer and has developed an action plan to move Russian troops through neighboring Georgia to stage in Armenia, which borders on the Islamic republic, according to informed Russian sources.

Russian Security Council head Viktor Ozerov said that Russian General Military Headquarters has prepared an action plan in the event of an attack on Iran.

Dmitry Rogozin, who recently was the Russian ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, warned against an attack on Iran.

“Iran is our neighbor,” Rogozin said. “If Iran is involved in any military action, it’s a direct threat to our security.” Rogozin now is the deputy Russian prime minister and is regarded as anti-Western. He oversees Russia’s defense sector.

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  1. An important question to be evaluated here is if nuclear weapons were used or if there was nuclear explosions or leaks, what would fall out effects be? Where would fall out travel?
    What are potential wind patterns?

    Ed K

  2. Another question to be asked “Is Putin a reincarnation of Stalin?”

    With his buildup of military along Iranian border, read
    the following article. It is time to evaluate:

    Russia: Scholars Shed New Light on Cold War Kremlin

    “For a few dedicated academics, the Cold War
    isn’t dead. While recent archival research tends
    to uphold existing interpretations of the superpower
    confrontation, scholars have made a few exciting

    Mark Kramer, director of the Cold War Studies
    Program and senior fellow at the Davis Center
    for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard
    University, discussed some recent discoveries
    during an early April seminar at George
    Washington University.

    In work that has relevance to the present day,
    Kramer said that documents recently reviewed
    in Soviet archives shed light on the Kremlin’s
    decade-long war effort in Afghanistan. The
    archives make clear that most Soviet military
    commanders “were opposed to getting involved”
    in Afghanistan since they wanted to fight wars in
    Europe, or against China and “not get bogged
    down in peripheral areas.” But the KGB and other
    power ministries eventually forced a reluctant
    Politburo to act in late 1979. The Red Army
    remained in Afghanistan until 1989.

    The archives also showed “how the Soviet Union
    managed to get out of a conflict that it probably
    should not have gotten involved in.” Kramer says
    it would be a mistake to consider the Soviet
    occupation of Afghanistan a total failure—the
    military made some “costly early mistakes,” but
    then turned things around and waged a reasonably
    effective counter-insurgency campaign.

    An overlooked aspect of the Soviet occupation is
    the skill with which the Red Army’s withdrawal
    was executed. In addition, the Afghan government
    under Najibullah that Moscow left behind managed
    to survive for three years on its own, and fell only
    after the Soviet Union itself disintegrated. Kramer
    remarked that current Afghan President Hamid
    Karzai would be lucky to survive so long without
    NATO combat forces in the country propping up his
    administration. Still, “if the Soviet leaders had heeded
    their original instincts they probably would have
    been better off,” Kramer said.

    Kramer went on to highlight the work of a
    colleague, Jamil Hasanli, whose research focuses
    on Stalin’s efforts to seize Iranian Azerbaijan
    immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany.
    Hasanli’s recently published book, At the Dawn
    of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over
    Iranian Azerbaijan, draws on formerly top-secret
    materials in the Soviet and Azerbaijani archives,
    as well as documents from American, British, and
    Iranian sources. It focuses on the rise and collapse
    of the national government of the autonomous
    republic of Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945–46.

    Hasanli’s study also examines triangular relationships
    involving politicians in Baku, Tabriz, and Moscow,
    illustrating the influence of local actors and
    personalities on great power politics. The lessons
    of that post-World War II episode remain pertinent
    today. “It still would be politically a very questionable
    proposition to somehow try to unify [those] regions,
    or encourage insurgencies,” Kramer said.

    Among the other interesting tidbits of Kramer’s
    April 4 presentation, Stalin’s death in 1953 may
    have averted a US-Soviet conflict. “In the final two
    years of Stalin’s life (1951-53),” Kramer noted,
    “preparations for war on the part of the Soviet
    Union were far more extensive than previously
    realized” by either scholars or US policy makers.

    Conventional wisdom in the United States had long
    held that the vigorous American response to the
    North Korean invasion of the South had “dissuaded”
    further Soviet aggression. But documentation in
    East European archives show that the Soviet bloc
    experienced a “war scare” in January 1951, when
    Stalin ordered a crash military buildup. According
    to Kramer, the Soviet armed forces doubled in size
    over the next two years.

    Stalin’s mood appears to have taken “a much more
    pessimistic turn at the end of his life,” Kramer said.
    Immediately after Stalin’s death, the war scare
    ended and Soviet bloc governments halted their
    expensive buildup.”

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