". . . a republic, if you can keep it."
Following the failed terror attack aboard a Northwest Airlines Detroit-bound flight on Christmas day, Napolitano has changed her tune from: Once the incident occurred, the system worked, to Our system did not work in this instance.
(Read more from ostroyreport.com)
We are in goooooood hands, people. </sarcasm>
Taking off your shoes at the airport. Bloated no-fly lists. Random screenings and searches. Little plastic bags full of 3-ounce liquid containers. All of these measures were reactionary responses to terrorism on airlines. None of it works.
All of this, however, is the definition of security theater:
Security theater consists of security countermeasures intended to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually improve security. The term was coined by Bruce Schneier for his book Beyond Fear, but has gained currency in security circles, particularly for describing airport security measures. It is also used by some experts such as Edward Felten to describe the airport security repercussions due to the September 11 attacks. Security theater gains importance both by satisfying and exploiting the gap between perceived risk and actual risk.
Taking off your shoes at the airport does nothing to prevent terrorist attacks on airlines. The shoe-bomber plot was foiled, and that particular technique is unlikely to be tried again. Instead, we’ll get new methods, like the most recent over Christmas in Detroit, with condoms full of explosives taped to legs.
What’s next in this game of whack-a-mole? We’re already hearing of new restrictions aimed at thwarting this latest incident, which is unlikely to be repeated:
According to a statement posted Saturday morning on Air Canada’s Web site, the Transportation Security Administration will severely limit the behavior of both passengers and crew during flights in United States airspace — restricting movement in the final hour of flight. Late Saturday morning, the T.S.A. had not yet included this new information on its own Web site.
“Among other things,” the statement in Air Canada’s Web site read, “during the final hour of flight customers must remain seated, will not be allowed to access carry-on baggage, or have personal belongings or other items on their laps.”
What’s next, flying without pants? How about the logical extreme, flying naked?
Republicans (and Joe Lieberman) are already up in arms about how the “system” didn’t work and how we’ve got to launch another invasion. Of course the system didn’t work! It’s not designed to work. The airline security system is designed to give scared Americans a feeling of security, right down to National Guard troops in airports with huge machine guns that contain no bullets. Meanwhile, as Schneier and others point out, security theater has real costs. The screening technology at airports cost money. The embarrassing screening procedures take time. Garbage-in, garbage-out no-fly lists erode our civil liberties and privacy.
Chechen terrorists did it in 2004. I said this in an interview with then TSA head Kip Hawley in 2007:
I don’t want to even think about how much C4 I can strap to my legs and walk through your magnetometers.
And what sort of magical thinking is behind the rumored TSA rule about keeping passengers seated during the last hour of flight? Do we really think the terrorist won’t think of blowing up their improvised explosive devices during the first hour of flight?
From schneier.com:
For years I’ve been saying this:
Only two things have made flying safer [since 9/11]: the reinforcement of cockpit doors, and the fact that passengers know now to resist hijackers.
This week, the second one worked over Detroit. Security succeeded.
EDITED TO ADD (12/26): Only one carry on? No electronics for the first hour of flight? I wish that, just once, some terrorist would try something that you can only foil by upgrading the passengers to first class and giving them free drinks.
the reinforcement of cockpit doors, and the fact that passengers know now to resist hijackers.